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MINIMUM MODELS OF SECOND-ORDER SET THEORIES
KAMERYN J. WILLIAMS
Abstract. In this article I investigate the phenomenon of minimum models of second-order
set theories, focusing on Kelley–Morse set theory KM, Go¨del–Bernays set theory GB, and GB
augmented with the principle of Elementary Transfinite Recursion. The main results are the
following. (1) A countable model of ZFC has a minimum GBC-realization if and only if it ad-
mits a parametrically definable global well-order. (2) Countable models of GBC admit minimal
extensions with the same sets. (3) There is no minimum transitive model of KM. (4) There is a
minimum β-model of GB + ETR. The main question left unanswered by this article is whether
there is a minimum transitive model of GB+ ETR.
1. Introduction
The jumping-off point for this article is the following well-known theorem.
Theorem (Shepherdson [She53], Cohen [Coh63]). If there is a transitive model of ZF then there is
a minimum transitive model of ZF. That is, there is a transitive model M of ZF so that if N is any
transitive model of ZF then M ⊆ N . Indeed, this minimum model also satisfies AC and V = L.
From a modern perspective, this result is not difficult to prove. This minimum model is Lα
where α is the least height of a transitive model of ZF. The absoluteness of L gives that Lα is
contained in every transitive model of ZF.1
This proof can be generalized to get analogous results for many weakenings or strengthenings T
of ZF. What we need from T is that it has a transitive model, is strong enough to build the inner
model L, and is absolute to L, meaning that M |= T implies LM |= T . On the weaker side, KP
satisfies the conditions—see [Bar75, chapter II]. The minimum transitive model of KP is Lω = Vω
and the minimum transitive model of KP + Infinity is LωCK1 , where ω
CK
1 is the Church–Kleene
ordinal. On the stronger side, we get minimum transitive models of ZFC plus small large cardinals.
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I am grateful to the anonymous referee for their many helpful comments. The present article is substantially
improved thanks to their time and care in reviewing it. I also want to thank Joel David Hamkins, under whose
supervision I wrote my dissertation, written while this paper was under review and consisting in part of the material
herein.
1The anonymous referee noted that the Shepherdson-Cohen minimum model Lα is also the minimum model of ZF
in the following sense: it is, up to isomorphism, the unique model of ZF which can be isomorphically embedded into
every model of ZF. I reproduce their proof of this fact here. If N is well-founded, then by the Shepherdson–Cohen
theorem Lα embeds into a transitive submodel of N . In this case, the embedding is moreover ∆0-elementary. If N
is not well-founded, it has a countable elementary submodel N0 which must also be ill-founded. By a theorem of
Hamkins [Ham13, corollary 29] there is therefore an embedding of Lα into N0, hence an embedding of Lα into N .
That Lα is the unique such model follows from the Shepherdson–Cohen theorem combined with the fact that any
model which embeds into a well-founded model must also well-founded.
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There is, for instance, a minimum transitive model of ZFC + there is a Mahlo cardinal. It is not
difficult to see, however, that this cannot be extended too far up the large cardinal hierarchy.
There is no minimum transitive model of any T extending ZFC which proves there is a measurable
cardinal. This is because by a well-known theorem of Scott [Sco61], if N |= ZFC has a measurable
cardinal then there is an elementary embedding j : N →M to an inner modelM , with the measure
not in M .2 So any transitive model of such T contains a strictly smaller transitive model of T .
Moreover observe that Scott’s theorem can be internalized to any model of ZFC with a measurable
cardinal, whether or not it is well-founded. This yields that any M |= ZFC + “there is measurable
cardinal” has a proper transitive submodel which satisfies the same first-order theory. Define the
pre-order ⊳end on models of ZFC as M ⊳end N if M embeds as a transitive submodel of N . Or to
use language that will be introduced in the next section, M ⊳end N if and only if N end-extends
an isomorphic copy of M . So this same argument shows that if T is any extension of ZFC which
proves there is a measurable cardinal, then there is no ⊳end-minimal model of T .
3
In contrast, results from inner model theory show that if there is a transitive model which thinks
the ordinal κ is measurable, then there is a minimum such model. This extends to strong cardinals,
Woodin cardinals, etc.4
A second direction the Shepherdson–Cohen result could be generalized is from first-order set
theory to second-order set theory. Given some second-order set theory, does it have a minimum
transitive model? A natural first theory to look at here is GB, Go¨del–Bernays set theory. This was
already answered by Shepherdson in the positive; see theorem 19.
While the existence of a minimum transitive model of GB is already settled, I also look the
situation where we fix the sets of our model but allow the classes to vary. In this context, it is most
interesting to consider GBC, Go¨del–Bernays set theory with Global Choice.
Main Theorem 1. A countable model M |= ZFC has a minimum GBC-realization if and only if
M has a parametrically definable global well-ordering.
Main Theorem 2. If (M,X ) |= GBC is countable, then {Y : (M,Y) |= GBC and X ( Y} has
minimal elements.
In contrast to the Shepherdson result, stronger second-order set theories lack minimum transitive
models.
Main Theorem 3. There is no minimum transitive model of KM. Nor is there a minimum
transitive model of GB+Π11-CA, nor any computably axiomatizable extension thereof.
I also consider theories intermediate between GB and GB + Π11-CA. The most important such
theory I will consider is GB+ETR, where ETR is the principle of Elementary Transfinite Recursion.
And I consider other theories obtained by weakening ETR. My main result here concerns β-models
of GB + ETR. A transitive model of second-order set theory is a β-model if it is correct about
well-foundedness for class relations. This gives a more restricted class of models.
2For a full proof, consult [Jec03, Lemma 17.9 (ii)].
3I thank the referee for pointing out this extension of the argument.
4Briefly: It is well-known that if κ is measurable there is a minimum inner model which thinks κ is measurable,
of the form L[U ] where U is a normal measure on κ. See [Kan04, section 20] for a proof. From this it follows that if
α is the least height of a model of ZFC which thinks κ is measurable then a model of the form Lα[U ] is the minimum
transitive model which thinks that κ is measurable. A similar argument can be made for other large cardinals with
canonical inner models. The reader is advised to consult [Zem01] for the construction up to a strong cardinal, and
[MS94] for the argument for Woodin cardinals.
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Main Theorem 4. There is a minimum β-model of GB+ETR, if there is any β-model of GB+ETR.
Combined with the results that GB and KM have minimum β-models, due respectively to Shep-
herdson [She53] and Marek and Mostowski [MM75],5 we have the following state of affairs.
minimum transitive model? minimum β-model?
GB Y Y
GB+ ETR ? Y
KM N Y
Left open by this article is filling in the question mark in the table: does GB + ETR have a
minimum transitive model? While I do not answer this question, I do show that weak enough
fragments of GB + ETR do have minimum transitive models; in particular, GB + ETROrd has a
minimum transitive model.6
The structure of this article is as follows. I first discuss some preliminary definitions and results,
followed by a look at some antecedents for my work in the literature, and parallels to work in
second-order arithmetic. The remainder of the paper is organized by the strength of the theories
considered. These three sections are largely independent, and may be read by the reader in any
order. First comes the section about GB. I present proofs of the above-mentioned Shepherdson
results and prove main theorems 1 and 2. The next section is devoted to ETR and its fragments. I
prove main theorem 4 and show that there are minimum transitive models for GB plus weak enough
fragments of ETR. I end the section by separating these fragments of ETR. The final section of the
paper is about KM and other strong second-order set theories. I prove main theorem 3 and give a
proof of the Marek–Mostowski result that there is a minimum β-model of KM. I also show that no
countable transitive model of ZF has a minimum KM-realization.
2. Preliminaries
The second-order set theories considered in this article are formulated so that their models consist
of two sorts, the sets of or first-order part of the model and the classes of or second-order part of
the model. All second-order set theories considered in this paper will include an axiom asserting
that extensionality holds for classes. This ensures that any model of these theories is isomorphic to
one whose second-order part consists of subsets of the first-order part. Without loss we can consider
only such models. Formally, models of second-order set theories are of the form (M,X ;∈(M,X ))
where M is the first-order part, X is the second-order part, ∈(M,X ) is the membership relation for
the model between sets and sets or between sets and classes. For simplicity, I will write (M,X ),
suppressing writing the membership relation. I will use ∈M , or simply ∈ if it is unambiguous, to
refer to the membership relation of M . In general, when talking about a multi-sorted structure I
will separate the sorts and the relations, functions, and constants with a semicolon.
A model (M,X ) of second-order set theory is transitive if M and X are transitive and its
membership relation is the true ∈. By the convention that X consists of subsets of M , for the
theories considered in this article it is enough just to ask for M itself to be transitive.
Definition 5. Given a second-order set theory T , the minimum transitive model of T , provided it
exists, is a transitive model (M,X ) of T so that if (N,Y) is any transitive model of T then M ⊆ N
and X ⊆ Y. For the theories we consider, this is equivalent to requiring that X ⊆ Y.
5See, respectively, corollary 20 and theorem 46.
6ETROrd is the restriction of ETR to recursions along Ord. See definition 9.
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If M is a first-order model of set theory and T is a second-order set theory, say that X ⊆ P(M)
is a T -realization for M if (M,X ) |= T . If there is some T -realization for M then we say that
M is T -realizable. The minimum T -realization for M , provided it exists, is X ⊆ P(M) so that
(M,X ) |= T and for any Y ⊆ P(M) if (M,Y) |= T then X ⊆ Y. That is, X is the minimum
T -realization for M if it is the minimum element in the poset consisting of all T -realizations for M
ordered by the subset relation.
We can also talk about minimal T -realizations, minimal transitive models of T , and so forth.
Recall the distinction between minimal and minimum elements. Given a partial order (P,<), a
minimal element m is one so that there is no p < m in P . A minimum element m has the stronger
property that m ≤ p for all p ∈ P . So, for example, a minimal transitive model of ZF is one which
does not contain any strictly smaller transitive model, while the minimum transitive model of ZF
is contained inside all transitive models.7
Observe that if X is the minimum T -realization for M , then X =
⋂
{Y : (M,Y) |= T }. This is
the motivation for the following definition.
Definition 6. Let T be a second-order set theory and let M be a model of ZF. Set
XT (M) =
⋂
{Y : (M,Y) |= T }.
If the context is clear I will just write XT .
We can then phrase the question of whether M has a minimum T -realization as: is it the case
that (M,XT ) |= T ? In case the answer is no, the question is then: what axioms are satisfied by
(M,XT )?
A transitive model (M,X ) of second-order set theory is a β-model if it is correct about well-
foundedness for class relations. That is, if R ∈ X and (M,X ) |= “R is well-founded” then R really
is well-founded. Not every transitive model is a β-model, even if we restrict to models satisfying a
strong second-order set theory. This is in contrast to the well-known fact that well-foundedness is
absolute for transitive models of ZFC. For models of ZFC, there are two characterizations of well-
foundedness: a Π1 characterization, namely that every nonempty subset of domR has an R-minimal
element; and a Σ1 characterization, namely there is a ranking function from R to Ord.
In the second-order context, we still have access to the Π01 characterization.
8 The theories we
consider will prove that a class relation R has that every nonempty subclass of its domain has a
minimal element if and only if every nonempty subset of its domain has a minimal element.9 So in
fact it takes only a single unbounded first-order universal quantifier to assert that R is well-founded.
As such, well-foundedness is downward absolute to transitive models of second-order set theory;
if R ∈ X is well-founded in V then (M,X ) thinks R is well-founded. However, well-foundedness
for class relations is not upward absolute for transitive models of second-order set theory. The
7It is unfortunate that mathematicians are not always careful about the distinction; for instance, one sometimes
hears the Shepherdson–Cohen minimum transitive model called the minimal model of ZF, even though it satisfies
the stronger property. And observe that the existence of a minimal transitive model of ZF is trivially proven from the
assumption of the existence of a transitive model of ZF, simply by considering any model of minimum ordinal height.
On the other hand, the Shepherdson and Cohen proofs that there is a minimum transitive model use considerable
technology.
8To clarify, the superscript 0 and 1 refer to whether a formula includes quantification over classes, rather than the
arithmetical/analytical hierarchies from descriptive set theory. The 0 is for first-order quantification; for instance,
a Π01 formula has a single unbounded universal set quantifier, with all other quantifiers bounded. The 1 is for
second-order quantification; for instance, a Σ11 formula is of the form ∃Xϕ(X, P ) where ϕ is Π
0
k
for some k.
9See observation 21.
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trouble is that class relations can have rank > Ord so we cannot use the ∆00 definition of the von
Neumann ordinals to get a Σ01 characterization for well-foundedness. (Of course, well-foundedness
for set relations is upward absolute for transitive models.)
Similar to the definitions of the minimum transitive model of T , a T -realization for M , a T -
realizable model, and the minimum T -realization for M we can define the minimum β-model of
T , a β-T -realization for M , a β-T -realizable model, and the minimum β-T -realization for M . For
instance, X ⊆ P(M) is a β-T -realization for M if (M,X ) |= T is a β-model. I will also use Xβ,T (M)
to refer to the intersection of β-T -realizations for M .
The convention in this paper when talking about formulae in the language of set theory is to use
capital letters for classes and class variables and lowercase letters for sets and set variables. For
example, the formula ∀X∃y y ∈ X gives the (false) proposition that every class has some set as a
member.
Definition 7. Kelley-Morse set theory KM is the second-order set theory consisting of the following
axioms:
• ZF for the first-order part;
• Extensionality for classes;
• Class Replacement, asserting that the image of any set under a class function is a set;
• The Comprehension axiom schema, namely the axioms ∀P¯∃A∀x x ∈ A⇔ ϕ(x, P¯ ), for every
second-order formula ϕ(x, P¯ ). That is, ϕ can include quantifier over sets or over classes.
KM can be augmented with Global Choice GC, asserting that there is a bijection between V and
Ord, to get KMC. In general, my convention will be that if BAR is a second-order set theory I will
use BARC to mean BAR + GC.
Go¨del–Bernays set theory GB is axiomatized similarly, except that the Comprehension schema is
weakened. Its axioms are ZF for the first-order part, Extensionality for classes, Class Replacement,
and the Elementary Comprehension schema. This is a subschema of the Comprehension schema
where we restrict to only formulae which do not include class quantifiers. Following the conven-
tion for theories with Global Choice, GBC is GB + GC. We can consider other restrictions of the
Comprehension schema to get a hierarchy of theories ranging in strength from GB to KM. For a
natural number k, let Π1k-CA denote the restriction of Class Comprehension to the Π
1
k-formulae.
Then GB +Π10-CA is just GB and KM is GB +
⋃
k∈ω Π
1
k-CA. Levels of this hierarchy are separated
in terms of consistency strength. That is, GB+Π1k+1-CA proves the consistency of GB+Π
1
k-CA. In
this article we will also see ∆11-CA, Comprehension for ∆
1
1-properties.
10
Observe that Class Replacement together with Elementary Comprehension yield that Separation
and Replacement hold allowing classes as parameters.
Intermediate between Π10-CA and Π
1
1-CA is the principle ETR of Elementary Transfinite Recur-
sion. This schema asserts that if ϕ is a first-order formula (possibly with class parameters) and R
is a well-founded class relation then there is a solution to the recursion of ϕ along R. Formally, let
ϕ(x, Y,A) be a first-order formula, possibly with a class parameter A and let R be a well-founded
class relation. Denote by <R the transitive closure of R. The instance of ETR for ϕ and R asserts
that there is a class S ⊆ domR× V which satisfies
Sr = {x : ϕ(x, S ↾ r, A)}
10To be clear, instances of ∆11-CA have the form
∀P¯ ([∀x ∀Y ϕ(x, Y, P¯ )⇔ ∃Y ψ(x, Y, P¯ )]⇒ ∃A ∀x [x ∈ A⇔ ∀Y ϕ(x, Y, P¯ )]),
where ϕ and ψ have no class quantifiers.
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for all r ∈ domR. Here, Sr = {x : (r, x) ∈ S} denotes the r-th slice of S and
S ↾ r = S ∩ ({r′ ∈ domR : r′ <R r} × V )
is the partial solution below r. It is equivalent to define ETR by restricting the well-founded relations
allowed to well-founded partial orders, or to well-founded trees, or to well-orders; see [GH17, lemma
7].
One well-known class recursion is the Tarskian definition of truth. This recursion takes place
over a proper class tree of height ω. Thus, ETR asserts the existence of a first-order truth predicate
and hence proves Con(ZF), as restricting the truth predicate to parameter-free formulae gives a
consistent completion of ZF.11 This shows that ETR exceeds GB in consistency strength. For an
upper bound, one can use Π11-CA to show that there is no least failure of a potential solution to an
elementary recursion and from that conclude that a solution must exist. Indeed, GB+ETR+∆11-CA
proves the consistency of GB + ETR [Sat14, theorem 33]. In particular, GB + Π11-CA proves the
consistency of GB + ETR. (And we can add Global Choice to both theories here and the result
remains true.)
A useful fact is that Elementary Transfinite Recursion is equivalent to having solutions to a
certain class of recursions. See [Fuj12, Corollary 61] and [GH17, Theorem 8].
Theorem 8. Over GB, Elementary Transfinite Recursion is equivalent to the assertion that for
every class A and every class well-order Γ there is a Γ-iterated first-order truth predicate relative
to A.
A Γ-iterated truth predicate is a class T of triples (a, ϕ, p) where (a, ϕ, p) ∈ T intuitively means
that ϕ(p) is true at level a ∈ dom(Γ). Here, ϕ is in the language with ∈ and a predicate symbol Tˆ
for T . Formally, this is defined by a modified form of the Tarskian recursion, with an extra clause
in the definition asserting that (a, pTˆ (x, y, z)q, 〈b, ϕ, p〉) ∈ T if and only if b <Γ a and (b, ϕ, p) ∈ T .
A truth predicate relative to A is for the language expanded with a predicate symbol Aˆ for A, with
an extra clause in the definition asserting that (a, pAˆ(x)q, p) ∈ T if and only if p ∈ A.
It can be proven from GB that any two would-be Γ-iterated truth predicates relative to A must
be the same class: By Elementary Comprehension we can form the class of indices where they
disagree, and so if they disagree they must disagree at a minimal point, from which we can derive
a contradiction. I will use TrΓ(A) to refer to the unique Γ-iterated truth predicate relative to
A. Iterated truth predicates not relative to any class will be denoted TrΓ. As a special case,
Tr(A) = Tr1(A) is the ordinary truth predicate relative to A.
I include a brief proof sketch for theorem 8 below, in order to illustrate that we in fact get a
stronger result. For a full proof see the above cited literature.
Proof sketch of theorem 8. (⇒) Construct TrΓ(A) by means of a recursion of rank ω · Γ.
(⇐) Given TrΓ(A) one can construct a solution to a recursion of ϕ (with parameter A) along a
relation of rank Γ. 
As an immediate corollary of this proof we get the following.
11If the model is ω-nonstandard, meaning that its ω is ill-founded, things are a little more delicate. The model
will still think that ZF is consistent because what it thinks is ZF, nonstandard instances of the axiom schemata and
all, will be contained in what it thinks is the first-order theory of the model, which it necessarily thinks is complete
and consistent.
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Definition 9. For a class well-order Γ, let ETRΓ denote the principle of Elementary Transfinite
Recursion restricted to relations of rank ≤ Γ and let ETR<Γ denote the restriction of Elementary
Transfinite Recursion to relations of rank < Γ.
Corollary 10. If ωω ≤ Γ then ETRΓ is equivalent over GB to the existence of Γ-iterated truth
predicates relative to any class.
Proof. The assumption on Γ implies that ω ·Γ < Γ+Γ. Because ETRΓ implies ETRΓ+Γ (and ETRΓ·n
for all standard n), this gives that we can do the necessary recursions of rank ω · Γ. 
It must be clarified just what it means for a model to satisfy ETRΓ. If Γ ∈ X then it makes
sense to ask whether (M,X ) satisfies ETRΓ—simply use Γ as a parameter. However, this approach
flounders upon the questions of whether there is a minimum β-model of or a minimum transitive
model of GB+ ETRΓ. How should Γ be interpreted if we do not already have a model in mind?
To handle this context, suppose Γ is a name for a class well-order, meaning Γ is defined by some
formula which GB proves defines a well-order. For example, Γ could be ωω, ω1, Ord, or some other
definable well-order. I will slightly abuse notation and use ETRΓ in this context, referring to the
theory in the language with ∈ as its only non-logical symbol. And ETR<Γ is similarly used in this
context. One natural instance of this is ETROrd, asserting that recursions of rank ≤ Ord have
solutions.12 Different models will have different Ords, but since GB proves that Ord is a well-order,
it always is sensible to ask whether (M,X ) satisfies ETROrd.
GB
GB + there is a truth predicate
GB+ ETRγ ; ω
ω ≤ γ < Ord
GB+ ETR<Ord
GB+ ETROrd
GB+ ETRΓ; Γ ≥ Ord · ω
GB+ ETR
GB+Π11-CA
GB+Π1k-CA; k > 1
KM
Some second-order set theories from GB to KM, separated by consistency strength.
2.1. Models of second-order set theories. In the interest of completeness of presentation, I
will summarize some well-known facts about how we construct models of these second-order set
theories.
12To briefly attempt to justify the naturalness of ETROrd, Gitman, Hamkins, Holy, Schlict, and myself showed
[GHHSW17] that ETROrd exactly captures the strength of the forcing theorem for class forcings, along with several
other principles.
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Let M |= ZF. Say that A ⊆ M is strongly amenable (to M) if (M,A) |= ZF(A), where ZF(A) is
the expansion of ZF obtained by allowing a predicate symbol for A in the axiom schemata of ZF.
If A is strongly amenable then A is amenable, meaning that for A∩ x is a set in M for any x ∈M .
Observe that every class in a model of GB is strongly amenable to the first-order part.
The following observation is key in constructing models of GB and GBC.
Observation 11. Let M be a model of ZF and suppose A ⊆ M is strongly amenable. Then
Def(M ;A) is a GB-realization for M , where Def(M ;A) is the collection of classes of M first-order
definable from A and set parameters. If a global well-order ofM is definable from A, then Def(M ;A)
is a GBC-realization for M .
In particular, Def(M) = Def(M ; ∅) is always a GB-realization for M . So any model of ZF is
GB-realizable. If M moreover has a definable (from parameters) global well-order then Def(M) is
a GBC-realization for M . Note that having a definable global well-order is equivalent to satisfying
the axiom ∃x V = HOD({x}), where HOD({x}) denotes the (definable) class of all sets hereditarily
definable from ordinal parameters and x. (Having a global well-order definable without parameters
is equivalent to V = HOD.) Therefore, any model of of ZFC+∃x V = HOD({x}) is GBC-realizable.
We can do better. Any countable model of ZFC has a GBC-realization, even if it does not have
a definable global well-order. This can be seen by a class forcing argument, which was originally
noticed by several mathematicians, among them Cohen, Felgner, and Solovay. Of these, only Felgner
published the argument [Fel71; Fel76]. Gaifman later found a forcing-free model-theoretic proof
[Gai75]. To sketch the argument: If C is a Cohen-generic subclass of Ord, then by density C codes
a strongly amenable global well-order. If M |= ZFC is countable we can find such C ∈ V as we only
need to meet countably many dense definable classes of M . This gives us (M,Def(M ;C)) |= GBC
in V . As a consequence, GBC is conservative over ZFC. That is, any first-order theorem of GBC is
a theorem of ZFC. In particular, GBC 6⊢ Con(ZFC), supposing GBC is consistent.
This construction does not generalize to uncountable models of ZFC. Say that a model of set
theory is rather classless if its only amenable classes are its classes definable from set parameters.
Note that the height of a rather classless model must have uncountable cofinality. Any ω-sequence
cofinal in the ordinals of a model will be amenable because its initial segments are finite.
Definition 12. LetM be a model of set theory. An extension N ⊇M is an end-extension ifM is a
transitive subclass of N . That is, N end-extends M whenever given any a ∈M , if N |= b ∈ a then
b ∈ M . And an end-extension N ⊇ M is a top-extension or rank-extension if M is a rank-initial
segment of N .
Note that top-extensions are end-extensions but the converse does not in general hold. However,
if N is an elementary end-extension of M |= ZF then it must be a top-extension: By elementarity,
VMα = V
N
α cannot have any new elements.
Theorem 13 (Keisler [Kei74], Shelah [She78]). Any countable model of ZF has an elementary
end-extension to a rather classless model.13
If we start with countableM |= ZFC with no definable global well-order, then any rather classless
N which is an elementary extension of M has no amenable global well-order and therefore has no
GBC-realization. That such M exists was proved by Easton in his doctoral dissertation [Eas64].14
13Keisler showed this theorem under the assumption of ♦ and the assumption of ♦ was later eliminated by Shelah.
14Easton’s dissertation was published in the Annals of Mathematical Logic [Eas70], but this publication omits the
section where he proves this result. See [Fel76, section 3] for a published copy of Easton’s argument, or [Ham12] for
a publicly available version of the argument on MathOverflow.
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For stronger theories, such as KM or GB+ETR, we cannot hope for techniques as general as in the
GB case. A significant obstacle is that these theories prove Con(ZF); consequently, a model of ZF can
fail to have, say, a KM-realization simply by having the wrong theory. And we can separate models
of these stronger theories in a similar way; for example, if (M,X ) |= GB+ETR+¬Con(GB+ETR),
then M cannot be KM-realizable.
For M |= ZF to be KM-realizable it must satisfy the first-order consequences of KM. But this
condition is in fact insufficient. There is no theory whose models are all KM-realizable. In fact, we
need much less than KM for this.
Theorem 14 (Krajewski [MM75, page 475]). There is no first-order theory all of whose models
(or even just whose countable models) are (GB+ ETRω)-realizable. That is, given any consistent T
extending ZF there is a countable model of T which has no (GB+ ETRω)-realization.
Proof. First suppose that M is a model of T and X is an (GB + ETRω)-realization for M . (If no
model of T is (GB + ETRω)-realizable we are already done.) Consider Tr ∈ X , the truth predicate
for M , which exists as it can be constructed by an elementary recursion of ω. By reflection, there
is a club of ordinals α ∈ OrdM so that (V Mα ,Tr ∩ V
M
α ) thinks that Tr ∩ V
M
α satisfies the recursive
Tarskian definition of truth. If M is ω-standard, meaning that ωM is well-founded, then Tr is the
real truth predicate for M . If M is ω-nonstandard, then Tr restricted to the standard formulae
is truth for M . In either case, we get that VMα ⊆ M satisfies the full elementary diagram of M
and hence is elementary in M . Moreover, these VMα form an elementary tower which unions up to
M . Altogether, we have seen that the first-order part of any model of ETRω must be the union
of an elementary tower from its Vαs. In particular, any ETRω-realizable model must contain many
undefinable ordinals.
On the other hand, Paris showed [Par73] that every T extending ZF has a model whose every
ordinal is definable without parameters. Such models are now known as Paris models.15 The
previous paragraph shows that no Paris model can be ETRω-realizable, and thus no first-order
theory can characterize the ETRω-realizable models. 
One take-away from this is that constructing models of stronger second-order set theories is less
straightforward than constructing models of GB or GBC. This topic for ETR will be taken up in
section 5. For KM, probably the simplest way to produce a model comes from looking at inaccessible
cardinals: if κ is inaccessible, then (Vκ, Vκ+1) |= KM. Of course, once we have any transitive model
of KM we get countable transitive models by Lo¨wenheim–Skolem. Indeed, (Vκ, Vκ+1) satisfies more
than just KM.
Definition 15. The Class Collection axiom schema asserts that if for every set there is a class sat-
isfying some property, then there is a single class coding the “meta-class” consisting of a witnessing
class for every set. Formally, instances of this schema take the form
∀P¯
[
(∀x∃Y ϕ(x, Y, P¯ ))⇒ (∃C∀x ∃i ϕ(x, (C)i, P¯ ))
]
,
where (C)i = {y : (i, y) ∈ C}.
The Class Choice axiom schema strengthens Class Collection to have that the index of the
witnessing class for x is x itself. That is, instances of Class Collection have the form
∀P¯
[
(∀x∃Y ϕ(x, Y, P¯ ))⇒ (∃C∀x ϕ(x, (C)x, P¯ ))
]
.
Proposition 16. Over GB, Class Choice is equivalent to Class Collection plus Global Choice.
15The name Paris model comes from [Ena05], which contains a thorough investigation of their properties.
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Proof. (⇒) It is immediate that Class Collection follows from Class Choice. To see that Global
Choice also follows, observe that for each x 6= ∅ there is a singleton class Y ⊆ x. We do not need
any fragment of choice beyond that afforded by first-order logic to make this conclusion. So by
Class Choice there is a class C so that for each x 6= ∅ we have (C)x ⊆ x is a singleton. Now define
a class function F : V \ {∅} → V by setting F (x) to be the unique element of (C)x. It is clear that
such F is a global choice function, the existence of such being one equivalent formulation of Global
Choice.
(⇐) Suppose for each x there is Y so that ϕ(x, Y, P ) for some fixed parameter P . By Class
Collection there is a class D so that for each x there is i so that ϕ(x, (D)i, P ). Now define a new
class C by putting (x, y) into C if and only if (ix, y) ∈ D where ix is least, according to a fixed global
well-order, so that ϕ(x, (D)ix , P ). Then C witnesses the instance of Class Choice for ϕ(x, Y, P ). 
It can be readily checked that if κ is an inaccessible cardinal, then (Vκ, Vκ+1) |= KM + Class
Collection. If AC holds in the background universe, it will moreover satisfy Global Choice, and
hence Class Choice. Indeed, every model of KM + Class Collection looks like the (Vκ, Vκ+1) of
some appropriate model of set theory.
Definition 17. Let ZF−I denote the theory whose axioms are those of ZF
− (namely, the axioms
of ZF without Powerset but axiomatized with Separation and Collection instead of Replacement16)
along with the assertion that there is a largest cardinal κ and that κ is inaccessible. To be clear
since in this context not all sets have powersets, the assertion that κ is inaccessible is: κ is regular,
Vκ exists, and for every a ∈ Vκ we have that P(a) exists and is an element of Vκ. And let ZFC
−
I be
the theory obtained from ZF−I by adding the assertion that every set can be well-ordered.
Marek and Mostowski [MM75] showed that KM + Class Collection and ZF−I are bi-interpretable,
as are KMC + Class Collection and ZFC−I . The backward direction is simple. Namely, if M |= ZF
−
I
with largest cardinal κ ∈M then one can straightforwardly see that (Vκ
M , Vκ+1
M ) |= KM + Class
Collection. To have a name for this, call it the cutting-off construction.
The forward interpretation goes through what I will call the unrolling construction. The idea is,
just as we can code hereditarily countable sets as subsets of ω, we can code ‘sets’ of rank > Ord via
certain class relations. Call a well-founded, extensional binary relation with a maximum element
a membership code. These are the representatives of the sets in the unrolled structure, where we
identify isomorphic membership codes. For example, ∈ ↾ tc({x}) is a membership code which
represents the set x. We can define a suitable membership relation between membership codes—
namely A is a member of B if there is a predecessor a to the maximum element of B so that A is
isomorphic to the restriction of B below a. One can then show that this structure satisfies all of
ZF
−
I . And if one carries out one interpretation then the other, the resulting model is isomorphic to
the original model.17
In section 6 I will use that the unrolling construction can be carried out over models satisfying
much less than KM. The key facts are the same as in the KM + Class Collection case. Namely, if
(M,X ) satisfies a strong enough theory to carry out the unrolling construction then carrying out the
unrolling construction followed by the cutting construction produces a model isomorphic to (M,X ),
and this isomorphism is definable. And the same holds for cutting off followed by unrolling. In my
dissertation, I show that GB+ETR suffices to carry out the unrolling construction to get a structure
16In the absence of Powerset, Collection is stronger than Replacement [Zar96].
17Antos and S. Friedman [AF17] consider a different version of this construction, where they use trees for coding
rather than well-founded extensional graphs. Their construction gives the same bi-interpretability result.
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which satisfies an appreciable basic set theory [Wil18, chapter 2].18 To give more detail: GB alone
is enough to define the unrolled structure, with an appropriate membership relation between well-
founded, extensional class relations. To see that the unrolled structure satisfies basic axioms of
set theory, enough to carry out the cutting off construction, I went through the key lemma that
between two well-founded, extensional class relations A and B there is a maximum initial partial
isomorphism.19 From this lemma one can prove that the unrolled structure satisfies Extensionality,
Pairing, and other basic axioms of set theory, including Π0-Separation and Transfinite Recursion
for Π0-properties. This lemma is an easy consequence of ETR, since the maximum initial partial
isomorphism is built by an elementary transfinite recursion along either A or B. I conjecture that
this lemma cannot be proven from GB alone. Specializing this lemma to the case where A and B
are well-orders we get that class well-orders are comparable.
Conjecture. GB does not prove the comparability of class well-orders, asserting that given any two
class well-orders Γ and ∆ one embeds as an initial segment of the other.
To end this section, I wish to remark that when looking at the phenomenon of minimum models
moving from KM to KM + Class Collection is harmless.
Theorem 18 (Marek and Mostowski [MM75, theorem 2.5]). Let (M,X ) |= KM and let N ∈ X be
an inner model of M . Then there is Y ⊆ X so that (N,Y) |= KM + Class Collection. If N has a
global well-order in X , then Y may be picked so that (N,Y) satisfies Global Choice, and hence also
Class Choice.
Ratajczyk showed [Rat79] that an appropriate version of Marek and Mostowski’s theorem holds
with KM replaced by GB+Π11-CA,
20 and a restricted form of Class Collection.
3. Historical background
Before moving to the novel content in this article, I wish to place my results in the context
of previous work. The first result in this theme I will mention is a classical theorem, due to
Marek and Mostowski [MM75]. They proved that every β-KM-realizable model has a minimum
β-KM-realization.21 As an immediate corollary, if M has a definable global well-order and is β-KM-
realizable then it has a minimum β-KMC-realization. And it then follows from observation 21 below
that if M is β-KM-realizable then M has a minimal KM-realization, which is moreover a minimal
KMC-realization.
Their methods were improved by Ratajczyk [Rat79] to apply not just to KM but also to GB +
Π1k-CA, for k ≥ 1. This yields the same results from the previous paragraph but with KM replaced
with GB+Π1k-CA.
More recently, Antos and S. Friedman [AF17] investigated what they call minimal β-models
of MK∗∗, a certain strengthening of KMC + Class Collection. They showed that if (M,X ) is a
countable β-model of MK∗∗ then it can be expanded by hyperclass forcing to a β-model (N,Y) of
MK
∗∗ containing a certain real r which is minimum among β-models of MK∗∗ containing r. My
main theorem 3 can be strengthened to show that if T is a fixed computably axiomatizable extension
of KM, then given any real r there is never a transitive model of T which is minimum among those
18Global Choice is taken as a basic axiom in that chapter, but it is straightforward to see that it is not necessary
to carry out the unrolling construction and prove basic facts about the unrolled structure.
19An initial partial isomorphism is a partial isomorphism whose domain and range are both downward closed.
20Ratajczyk refers to this theory as KM1.
21See theorem 47 below.
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transitive models of T containing r; see theorem 49. I view this as justifying Antos and Friedman’s
restriction to looking only at β-models. They justify this restriction, in their footnote 3, by analogy
to ZFC, saying that it is only sensible to talk about minimum models when restricting to the class
of models correct about well-foundedness. In my view, this analogy is ill-founded. As other results
in the current paper show, there can be minimum models in collections of models which contain
non-β-models. Or for an example from first-order set theory: LωCK1 is the minimum transitive
model of KP + Infinity. But LωCK1 is not a β-model; Harrison showed [Har68] there are computable
linear orders which are ill-founded but have no infinite descending chain in LωCK1 . Nevertheless,
Antos and Friedman’s restriction to β-models is necessary to achieve such a result in their context.
Also important to mention in this context is that the class of transitive models of KM is strictly
larger than the class of β-models of KM. Indeed, Marek and Mostowski showed [MM75, theorem
3.2] that if τ is the least height of a transitive model of KM and β is the least height of a β-model of
KM, then τ < β and Lβ |= τ is countable. Applying Ratajczyk’s improvements gives an analogous
result for GB +Π1k-CA, for k ≥ 1.
Moving from models of second-order to a more general context, the same questions can be
asked about other second-order theories. The analogies and disanalogies between the second-order
set theory and second-order arithmetic have received considerable attention, much of it from the
Warsaw school of logicians centered around Mostowski. Similar questions to the ones I study in this
article have been asked and answered in the context of second-order arithmetic. Before I review
those results, let me briefly describe the setting for second-order arithmetic.
Models of second-order arithmetic are two-sorted. One sort, the first-order part of the model,
consists of the numbers, while the other, the second-order part, consists of sets of numbers. The
chief axiom for the numbers is induction, and the sets are axiomatized by principles similar to
those for classes in second-order set theory. This produces the following analogy between theories
of arithmetic and set theories. (I omit mention of RCA0 and WKL0, the weakest of the “Big
Five” theories of second-order arithmetic, as this paper does not study any set theoretic analogues
thereof.)
Arithmetic Set Theory
PA ZF
ACA0 GB
ATR0 GB+ ETR
Π1k-CA0 GB+Π
1
k-CA
Z2 KM
In set theory, there are a plethora of different first-order models whose membership relation is
well-founded. In arithmetic on the other hand, there is a unique first-order model which is well-
founded, namely ω. Those models of second-order arithmetic with ω as their first-order part are
appropriately known as ω-models. It is common practice to identify ω-models with their second-
order part, speaking for example of the ω-model HYP rather than (ω,HYP). Those ω-models which
are moreover correct about which of their sets are well-founded are called β-models. The following
are some of the results about minimum/minimal ω- and β-models of arithmetic.22 Below, ARITH
is the collection of arithmetical subsets of ω and HYP is the collection of hyperarithmetical subsets
of ω.
22The reader who wishes to know more is advised to consult [Sim09], especially chapter VIII. In particular, they
can find therein proofs and references for the following theorems.
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Theorem (Mostowski). ARITH is the minimum ω-model of ACA0. In general, if M |= PA then
Def(M), the collection of parametrically definable subsets of M is the minimum ACA0-realization
for M .
Theorem (Kleene). HYP is the minimum ω-model of ∆11-CA0, whose principal axiom is ∆
1
1-
Comprehension.
Theorem (Gandy-Kreisel-Tait). HYP is the intersection of all ω-models of Z2. Indeed, the same
holds with Z2 replaced with any computably axiomatizable extension of Σ
1
1-AC0 (in the language of
second-order arithmetic).23
Combined with the fact that (ω,HYP) 6|= Σ11-AC0, this theorem immediately implies that no
computably axiomatizable extension of Σ11-AC0 has a minimum ω-model. In particular, Z2 has no
minimum ω-model.
Theorem (Simpson). HYP is the intersection of all ω-models of ATR0. And the same holds if we
restrict to β-models. In particular, ATR0 has no minimum β-model.
Theorem (Gandy). Z2 has a minimum β-model.
Simpson showed that the same holds for ATR0 and Π
1
k-CA0, for k ≥ 1.
Theorem (H. Friedman). There is no minimal ω-model of Z2.
Theorem (Quinsey). Let T be a computably axiomatizable extension of ATR0 in the language of
second-order arithmetic. Let (M,X ) |= T be countable. Then there is Y ( X so that (M,Y) |= T .
That is, no countable M |= PA has a minimal T -realization. In particular, T has no minimal
ω-model.
Several of these results have reflections upward in the set theoretic realm. For example, that
Z2 has no minimum ω-model is the arithmetic counterpart to the fact that KM has no minimum
transitive model. I want to highlight one case where there is a known disanalogy. Simpson’s result
that there is no minimum β-model of ATR0 does not carry over to the set theoretic realm. Main
theorem 4 is that there is a minimum β-model of GB + ETR. The underlying reason for this
disanalogy is that in set theory, a class being well-founded is an elementary property, whereas in
arithmetic it is a Π11 property, and in fact is Π
1
1-universal. As will be made clear in section 5, my
construction of the minimum β-model of GB+ETR heavily uses that submodels of β-models of set
theory with the same first-order part are automatically β-models, a fact that follows immediately
from well-foundedness being elementary. From the other direction, Simpson’s argument uses that
being well-founded is Π11-universal in arithmetic. This is the source of other disanalogies between
GB+ ETR and ATR0; see e.g. [Sat14] or [Fuj12].
4. GB
Let us begin with a classical result.
Theorem 19 (Shepherdson [She53]). If there is a transitive model of GB then there is a minimum
transitive model of GB, and it moreover satisfies Global Choice.
23See [Sim09, section VIII.4] for a definition of Σ11-AC0, whose principal axiom is the axiom of choice for Σ
1
1
definable collections of sets. The reader should also be aware that ATR0 proves every instance of the schema of
Σ11-Choice.
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Proof. Let Lα be the minimum transitive model of ZFC. Then (Lα,Def(Lα)) = (Lα, Lα+1) is the
minimum transitive model of GBC. If (M,X ) is a model of GBC whose height is α, then Lα+1 ⊆ X
because L is a definable class. If the height of M is greater than α, then Lα+1 ⊆M . Finally, note
that it satisfies Global Choice because the L-order is definable. 
Essentially the same argument gives the following.
Corollary 20. If there is a β-model of GB then there is a minimum β-model of GB, and it satisfies
Global Choice.
The key to proving this is the following observation.
Observation 21.
(1) Let M |= ZF. If (M,X ) |= GB is a β-model and Y ⊆ X then (M,Y) is a β-model.
(2) Moreover, if (M,X ) |= GB is a β-model and (N,Y) |= GB is such that OrdN = OrdM ,
N ⊆M , and Y ⊆ X , then (N,Y) is a β-model.
Proof. (1) This follows immediately from the fact that “R is a well-founded class relation” can
be expressed via a first-order formula. Namely, I claim that, over GB, a binary relation R is
well-founded if and only if every nonempty set d ⊆ domR has a minimal element. Clearly, every
well-founded relation satisfies this property. For the other direction, suppose that R is ill-founded.
Let α0 be least so that Vα0 contains x ∈ domR so that the class R ↾ x = {(y, y
′) ∈ R : y, y′ <R x},
where <R is the transitive closure of R, is ill-founded. Let X0 ⊆ Vα0 be the set of such x. Given αn
and Xn, let αn+1 be least such that for each x
′ ∈ Xn we have Vαn+1 contains some xRx
′ for which
R ↾ x is ill-founded. And set Xn+1 ⊆ Vαn+1 to be the set of these x. Finally, set X =
⋃
n∈ωXn.
Then X is a set and R ↾ X is an ill-founded set-sized subrelation of R. So there is some d ⊆ X
without an R-minimal element.
(2) Suppose R ∈ Y is ill-founded. Then (M,X ) thinks that R is ill-founded, so there is d ∈ M
witnessing this. Let θ ∈ OrdM be so that d ∈ VMθ . Set r = R ∩ V
N
θ ∈ N . Then r ∈ M because
N ∈ Y ⊆ X . Observe that r is ill-founded, as M sees that d witnesses the ill-foundedness of r.
But r is a set in N which is a transitive model of ZFC. So N must think r is ill-founded and hence
(N,Y) thinks R is ill-founded. 
Proof of corollary 20. Consider (Lα,Def(Lα)), where α is least such that there is a β-model of GB
of height α. Let (M,X ) |= GB be a β-model with OrdM = α. Then Lα ⊇ M and Def(Lα) ⊆ X .
By the observation, (Lα,Def(Lα)) |= GBC is a β-model. It must be contained in every β-model of
GB. 
More interesting is the question of when there is a minimum GBC-realization for a model of
ZFC. Note that this is not interesting if we do not include Global Choice, as Def(M) is always the
minimum GB-realization for M .
Theorem 22 (Main theorem 1). Let M be a countable model of ZFC. Then M has a minimum
GBC-realization if and only if M has a parametrically definable global well-order.
Proof. (⇐) Any GBC-realization forM must contain Def(M). IfM has a definable global well-order
then Def(M) is itself a GBC-realization, hence it is the minimum GBC-realization for M .
(⇒) Suppose towards a contradiction that X is the minimum GBC-realization for M . As M has
no definable global well-order, it must be that X = Def(M ;G), where G 6∈ Def(M) is some global
well-order of M . Consider the forcing to add a Cohen subclass to Ord with set-sized conditions.
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Note that this forcing does not add any new sets as it is κ-closed for every κ. Let H be (M,X )-
generic for this forcing. That is, H meets every dense class in X . Then every set a ∈ M , is coded
into H . To expound, ZF proves that every set a is uniquely determined by the isomorphism type
of the graph Ea = (tc({a}),∈ ↾ tc({a})). Now use Choice to take an isomorphic copy of Ea on the
ordinals and look at its image under your favorite Σ0-definable pairing function Ord
2 → Ord. This
gives an ordinal-length binary sequence sa from which we can recover a. Indeed, a is constructible
from sa. By density, every ordinal-length binary sequence is coded into H , and thereby every set is
coded into H . This yields a global well-order definable from H : say that a <H b if the index where
a is first coded into H is less than the index where b is first coded into H . Therefore, Def(M ;H)
is a GBC-realization for M .
I claim that G 6∈ Def(M ;H). Otherwise, there is a first-order formula ϕ, possibly with set
parameters and H as a class parameter but where G does not appear as a parameter, so that
(M,Def(M ;G,H)) |= ∀x x ∈ G ⇔ ϕ(x,H). There is some p ∈ H forcing this statement; that is,
there is p ∈ H so that (M,Def(M ;G)) |= “p  ∀x x ∈ Gˇ ⇔ ϕ(x, H˙)”. Thus, (M,Def(M ;G)) |=
“∀x x ∈ G⇔ p  ϕ(xˇ, H˙)” so for all x ∈ M , we have x ∈ G if and only if (M,Def(M ;G)) |= [p 
ϕ(xˇ, H˙)]. But this formula doesn’t depend upon G, so this happens if and only ifM |= [p  ϕ(xˇ, H˙)].
Therefore G ∈ Def(M), contradicting that M has no definable global well-order.
As G 6∈ Def(M ;H), it cannot be that X = Def(M ;G) ⊆ Def(M ;H), contradicting that X is the
minimum realization. So M cannot have a minimum GBC-realization, as desired. 
As remarked in Section 2, a model of ZFC having a definable global well-order is equivalent to
that model satisfying the first-order sentence ∃x V = HOD({x}). Thus, whether a countable model
of set theory has a minimum GBC-realization is recognizable from the theory of the model.
Corollary 23. A countable model of ZFC has a minimum GBC-realization if and only if it satisfies
∃x V = HOD({x}). 
Corollary 24. Let M |= ZFC be countable. Then XGBC(M) = Def(M).
24
Proof. If Def(M) is a GBC-realization for M then it is the minimum GBC-realization, whence
XGBC(M) =M . Otherwise, the argument from the proof of theorem 22 that G 6∈ Def(M ;H) applies
to any A ∈ Def(M ;G) \ Def(M). Thus Def(M ;G) ∩ Def(M ;H) = Def(M) and so XGBC(M) ⊆
Def(M). The other inclusion is trivial, giving the desired equality. 
The construction used in the proof of theorem 22 does not show show that any countable M 6|=
∃x V = HOD({x}) lacks a minimal GBC-realization. The reason is that the Def(M ;G) and
Def(M ;H) from the proof are incomparable. We have already seen one direction, that Def(M ;G) 6⊆
Def(M ;H). The other direction, that Def(M ;H) 6⊆ Def(M ;G), is because by genericity H 6∈
Def(M ;G). We get that Def(M ;G) is not the minimum GBC-realization, but left open is the
possibility that it could be minimal.
Question 25. Is there M |= ZFC+ ∀x V 6= HOD({x}) with a minimal GBC-realization X for M?
Can this happen for countable M?
Answering this question in general seems difficult, but something can be said for special cases.
First is a negative result that minimal GBC-realizations cannot come from Cohen forcing.
Proposition 26. Consider M |= ZFC and suppose C ⊆ OrdM is Cohen-generic. Then, Def(M ;C)
is not a minimal GBC-realization.
24Recall definition 6.
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Proof. Define C′ as α ∈ C′ if and only if α · 2 + 1 ∈ C. If we think of C as an Ord-length binary
sequence, C′ is what appears on the odd coordinates of C. It is a standard result about Cohen
forcing that C′ is Cohen-generic but C 6∈ Def(M ;C′). Thus, Def(M ;C′) ( Def(M ;C) and so
Def(M ;C) is not minimal. 
If we want a model of ZFC with a minimal GBC-realization which is not minimum, we must start
with a model without a definable global well-order. We want to add a strongly amenable global
well-order to this model which is minimal in a certain sense. A natural place to look here is at
generalizations of Sacks forcing. As is well-known, Sacks reals are minimal over the ground model.
Can we generalize Sacks forcing to produce a minimal generic class of ordinals which codes a global
well-order?
Generalizing Sacks forcing to add generic classes of ordinals has been considered before. Hamkins,
Linetsky, and Reitz [HLR13] consider so-called “perfect generics”, an adaptation of a technique of
Kossak and Schmerl [KS06] from models of arithmetic. Kossak and Schmerl’s technique is in turn
an adaptation from Sacks forcing over ω. They produce minimal generics for countable modelsM of
arithmetic, i.e. inductive G ⊆M so that for A ∈ Def(M ;G) either A ∈ Def(M) or G ∈ Def(M ;A).
I do not see a way to use perfect generics to produce a minimal but not minimum GBC-
realizations. Nevertheless, a related result can be achieved.
Theorem 27 (Main theorem 2). Let (M,X ) |= GBC be countable. Then there is Y ) X a GBC-
realization which is minimal above X : if Z ) X is a GBC-realization, then Y ⊆ Z.
This theorem shows that the poset consisting of countable GBC-realizations of a fixed countable
M |= ZFC is not dense in a strong sense. For any X in this poset there is Y ⊇ X with no elements
of the poset in between them. On the other hand, proposition 26 gives Z ⊇ X so that the interval
(X ,Z) of intermediate GBC-realizations contains a dense linear order.
Before proving this theorem, it will be necessary to set up some machinery.
Work with a fixed countable M = (M,X ) |= GBC. Let B denote the full Ord-length binary tree.
For a perfect tree P ⊆ B, say that Q ⊆ P is n-deciding for P if for every Σn formula ϕ in the forcing
language for M , there is an ordinal α so that if p ∈ Q has length greater than α then p decides ϕ.
It is not hard to see that if P ∈ X then we can find Q ∈ X which is n-deciding for P. Moreover, we
can find such Q which does not split below a fixed α ∈ Ord.
Definition 28. A function G : Ord→ 2 is called a perfect generic if there is a sequence B = P0 ⊇
P1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Pn ⊇ · · · of perfect trees from X so that G =
⋃
(
⋂
n Pn) and Pn+1 is n-deciding for Pn
for all n.
A subtle point is that a perfect generic need not be fully generic over any of the Pn. So the
model generated by a perfect generic G, namely
M[G] = (M, {X ⊆M : X ∈ Def(M ;G,A) for some A ∈ X}),
need not be a class forcing extension of M. As such, we need to refine some standard facts about
class forcing. I summarize them here. First, the forcing relation (for pretame forcings, such as the
posets we will use) for formulae of bounded complexity is definable. That is, the relation p P ϕ,
confined to ϕ which are Σk is Σj-definable from P for some j > k. (It does not matter for our
purposes what this j is, just that it is finite.) Second, we need to refine the usual “forcing equals
truth” lemma: For ϕ which are Σk there is j > k so that for any G ⊆ P which is Σj-generic over
M then M[G] |= ϕ if and only if there is p ∈ G so that p P ϕ. This can be proved via a standard
inductive argument, attending to the complexity of the definitions of the dense sets involved. In
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short, the standard facts for forcing apply for partial generics, except that we must be careful to
confine ourselves to things which are sufficiently simple.
Using these refined forcing facts, we can see that M[G] will still satisfy GBC, despite not in
general being a forcing extension. Extensionality, Global Choice, and Elementary Comprehension
are immediate. To see M[G] satisfies Class Replacement, take a class function F . Then F is
definable by a Σk-formula for some k with parameters G and A ∈ X . But then the behavior of F
is forced by conditions in Pj ⊇ G for large enough j > k.
The following lemmata will be used to prove the theorem. They are set theoretic analogues of
results from section 6.5 of [KS06].
Lemma 29. Let ϕ(x) be a formula in the forcing language and P ∈ X be a perfect subtree of B.
There is Q ⊆ P in X so that one of the two cases holds:
(1) There is an ordinal α so that for all ordinals ξ we have that all p ∈ Q of length greater than
α decide ϕ(ξ) (in P) the same.
(2) For every ordinal α there is β > α so that if p, q ∈ Q both have length β and p ↾ α = q ↾ α
then there is an ordinal ξ so that p and q decide ϕ(ξ) differently (in P).
Proof. Fix k so that ϕ is a Σk formula. Take P
′ ⊆ P a k-deciding subtree for P. We may assume
that there is a function f : B→ P′ which embeds the full binary tree onto the splitting nodes of P′
and that f(s) decides ϕ(len s). There are two cases. The first is that there is some s ∈ B so that
for every t, t′ >B s if len t = len t
′ then f(t) and f(t′) decide ϕ(ξ) the same for all ordinals ξ. In
this case, set Q = P′ ↾ f(s) and get the first conclusion in the lemma.
The second case is that this does not happen for any s ∈ B. In this case, we can inductively
define a g : B→ P′ as follows:
• Set g(0) = f(0).
• Set g(sa0) = p0 and g(sa1) = p1, where p0, p1 are least (according to a fixed global well-
order) so that len p0 = len p1 and there is an ordinal ξ so that p0 and p1 decide ϕ(ξ)
differently. Such p0 and p1 always exist, as otherwise we would be in the previous case.
• At limit stages take unions.
Set Q = {p ∈ P′ : ∃s ∈ B p ≤P′ g(s)}. This yields the second conclusion in the lemma. 
Observe that we used global choice in an essential manner here. There are possibly many choices
for p0 and p1 in the successor stage of the construction of g. In order to guarantee that g ∈ X and
hence that Q ∈ X , we need to uniquely specify a choice.
This puts us in a position to prove a minimality lemma for perfect generics.
Lemma 30. Let (M,X ) |= GBC be countable. Then there is a perfect generic G 6∈ X so that for
any class A of ordinals definable from G (and possibly parameters from X ), either G is definable
from A and parameters from X or else A ∈ X .
Proof. Fix a cofinal sequence 〈αn〉 of ordinals and an enumeration 〈ϕn(x)〉 of formulae in the forcing
language. We construct a descending sequence of perfect trees
B = Q0 ⊇ P0 ⊇ Q1 ⊇ P1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Qn ⊇ Pn ⊇ · · ·
so that Pn is an n-deciding subtree of Qn which does not split below αn and Qn+1 ⊆ Pn is as in
the previous lemma for ϕn. Our perfect generic is G =
⋃
(
⋂
n Pn).
Consider a class of ordinals A defined from G and parameters in X , where G  x ∈ A⇔ ϕn(x).
Consider Qn+1 ⊆ Pn. If the first case from the previous lemma holds, then A ∈ X because ξ ∈ A if
and only if for every p ∈ Qn+1 the length of p being sufficiently long implies that p Pn ϕn(ξ). If the
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second case of the previous lemma holds, then we can define G from A. In this case, p ∈
⋂
n Pn if and
only if for every ordinal α there is q >Qn+1 p of length greater than α so that q Pn ϕn(ξ)⇔ ξ ∈ A
for all ordinals ξ. From a definition of
⋂
n Pn can easily be produced a definition for G. 
Proof of theorem 27. We start with countable (M,X ) |= GBC. Let G be the perfect generic as in
the minimality lemma. Set Y to be the classes definable from G and parameters in X . Then, Y
is a GBC-realization for M . Suppose that Z is a GBC-realization so that X ⊆ Z ⊆ Y. Consider
arbitrary A ∈ Z. We may assume that A is a class of ordinals by mapping A, via a fixed bijection
V → Ord from X , into the ordinals. By the minimality lemma, either G is definable from A or else
A ∈ X . Therefore, if Z 6= X then G is definable from an element of Z (with parameters from X )
and hence Y = Z. 
As remarked earlier, Global Choice was used essentially in the proof of lemma 29. Proving
this lemma without Global Choice would yield a construction for minimal but not minimum GBC-
realizations. Namely, start with a countable M |= ZFC with no definable global well-order. Let
X = Def(M). Then (M,X ) is a model of GB which does not satisfy Global Choice. Applying the
theorem to (M,X ) would yield a GBC-realization Y for M which is minimal above X . But since
any GBC-realization must contain X , this would give that Y is a minimal GBC-realization for M .
Thus, the problem of constructing a minimal but not minimum GBC-realization can be reduced
down to the problem of proving the minimality lemma for perfect generics without using choice. A
similar question can be asked for ordinary Sacks forcing.
Question 31. Is choice needed to prove the minimality lemma for Sacks forcing? That is, is it
consistent that there are M |= ZF + ¬AC, s ⊆ ωM Sacks-generic over M , and A ∈ M [s] so that
M (M [A] (M [s]?
5. ETR and its fragments
The main result of this section is that there is a smallest β-model of GB+ETR. First, a warm-up.
Theorem 32. If M |= ZF is β-(GB + ETR)-realizable, then M has a minimum β-(GB + ETR)-
realization. Moreover, if M has a definable global well-order then this minimum β-(GB + ETR)-
realization satisfies Global Choice.
Proof. Suppose (M,Y) |= GB + ETR is a β-model. Externally to (M,Y) we will construct a
(GB + ETR)-realization X ⊆ Y for M and then see that the construction for X gives the same
(GB+ ETR)-realization no matter which Y we started with.
Let X0 = Def(M). Observe that if M has a definable global well-order, (M,X0) satisfies Global
Choice. Now, given Xn, define Xn+1 to consist of all classes of M definable from elements of
{TrΓ(A) : A,Γ ∈ Xn and Γ is a class well-order}.
25 A few remarks are in order to clarify why this
definition is well-formed. First, note that X0 ⊆ Y and thus (M,X0) is a β-model by observation 21.
Second, if Xn ⊆ Y then Xn+1 ⊆ Y. This is because Y must have iterated truth predicates relative
to any of its classes and because Y and Xn agree on what class relations are well-founded, both
being β-models. Inductively, this yields that each Xn ⊆ Y is a β-model. Because each of these is
a β-model, they agree with V on whether Γ is a well-order. Finally, because M is transitive it has
unique iterated truth predicates relative to a given parameter.
Set X =
⋃
n Xn, so that X ⊆ Y. Because X is an increasing union of GB-realizations for M ,
it must be that X itself is a GB-realization for M . And if M has a definable global well-order,
25Recall that TrΓ(A) denotes the Γ-iterated truth predicate relative to the class A, where Γ is a class well-order.
MINIMUM MODELS OF SECOND-ORDER SET THEORIES 19
then (M,X ) moreover satisfies Global Choice. To see that (M,X ) satisfies Elementary Transfinite
Recursion, note that if A,Γ ∈ X then A,Γ ∈ Xn for some n and thus TrΓ(A) ∈ Xn+1 ⊆ X .
It remains only to see that we get the same X regardless of our choice of Y. But this is immediate,
since Y was not actually used to define the Xn. We only used that Xn ⊆ Y to conclude that (M,Xn)
is a β-model, and this is true for any Y a β-(GB+ ETR)-realization for M . 
Theorem 33 (Main Theorem 4). There is a minimum β-model of GB + ETR, if there is any
β-model of GB+ ETR. Moreover, this minimum β-model satisfies Global Choice.
Proof. First, let us see that if M is β-(GB+ ETR)-realizable then so is LM . This is of independent
interest, so I will separate it out as its own lemma.
Lemma 33.1. If M is β-(GB+ ETR)-realizable then LM is β-(GBC + ETR)-realizable.
Before proving this, let us see with an example why merely restricting the classes to those which
are subclasses of L will not work. Suppose (M,Y) |= GB + ETR is transitive with 0♯ ∈ M . Set
X = Y ∩P(LM ). Then, (LM ,X ) fails to satisfy Replacement. Consider A = 0♯ ∪ (OrdM \ ω) ∈ X .
But A ∩ ω 6∈ LM , so (LM ,X ) fails to satisfy Replacement. That is, the problem is that Y may
contain subclasses of LM which are not amenable to LM .
Proof of lemma 33.1. Let (M,Y) |= GB + ETR be a β-model. Define X ⊆ Y to consist of all the
subsets of LM which are amenable to LM . That is, X ∈ X if and only if X ⊆ LM and X ∩ a ∈ LM
for all a ∈ LM . By observation 21 we get that (LM ,X ) is a β-model. So the only work is to see
that (LM ,X ) |= GBC + ETR. That it satisfies Extensionality and Global Choice is immediate. To
see that it satisfies Class Replacement, take a class function F ∈ X and a set a ∈ LM . Working in
(M,Y), pick α so that F ↾ a ∈ Vα
M , which exists by Class Replacement in (M,Y). By amenability
we now get that f = F ∩ (Vα
M ∩ LM ) ∈ LM . So F ′′a = f ′′a ∈ LM , as desired.
To see that (LM ,X ) satisfies Elementary Comprehension, note that this follows immediately
once we know that LM satisfies Separation with parameters from X , since {x : ϕ(x, P¯ )} ∩ a =
{x ∈ a : ϕ(x, P¯ )}. We check that Elementary Comprehension with parameters from X holds by
induction on formulae. The atomic and boolean cases are easy, but note that we use amenability
to check the atomic case for the formula “x ∈ A”. For the quantifier case, we want to see that
b = {x ∈ a : ∀y ϕL
M
(x, y)} ∈ LM , where I have suppressed writing the parameters in ϕ. For
each y, let by = {x ∈ a : ϕL
M
(x, y)}, which is in LM by inductive hypothesis. Then observe that
b = {x ∈ a : ∀y x ∈ by}, so b ∈ LM .
Finally, let us see that (LM ,X ) |= ETR. Consider a first-order formula ϕ(x, Y, P ) with the
parameter P ∈ X and a class well-order Γ ∈ X . By ETR in (M,Y) there is a class S ∈ Y which
satisfies Sg = {x : ϕL
M
(x, S ↾ x, P )} for all g ∈ domΓ. We inductively show that S ∈ X . This
induction can be carried out inside (M,Y) because being amenable to LM is an elementary property.
The successor case follows because (LM ,X ) satisfies Elementary Comprehension. For the limit case,
we consider ∆ ⊆ Γ an initial segment without a maximum element and assume that S ↾ g ∈ X for
all g ∈ ∆. We want to see that S ↾ ∆ ∈ X . Toward this end, fix a ∈ LM . Now observe that
(S ↾ ∆) ∩ a =

 ⋃
g∈dom∆
S ↾ g

 ∩ a = {x ∈ a : ∃g ∈ dom∆ x ∈ S ↾ g}.
Because being S ↾ g is an elementary property in the parameters ∆ and g, and because we have
that S ↾ g ∈ X for all g ∈ dom∆, by Separation applied inside (LM ,X ) we thereby get that
(S ↾ ∆) ∩ a ∈ LM . So S ↾ ∆ ∈ X , completing the argument. 
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Let Lα be so that α is the least ordinal with Lα being β-(GB+ ETR)-realizable. By theorem 32,
let X be the minimum β-(GB+ETR)-realization for Lα. Note that (Lα,X ) satisfies Global Choice.
I claim that (Lα,X ) is the desired minimum β-model of GB+ETR. To see this, there are two cases
to consider. If (M,Y) |= GB + ETR is a β-model with OrdM = α, then theorem 32 yields that
X ⊆ Y. For the other case, if (M,Y) |= GB+ ETR with OrdM > α then Lα ∈M and thus M can
construct X by ordinary transfinite recursion on sets. Note that this uses that that the Γ used to
build X really are well-founded from the perspective of V , and hence also from the perspective of
M . 
Essentially the same argument gives minimum β-models for GB+ ETRΓ.
Lemma 34. If M |= ZF is β-(GB + ETRΓ)-realizable for Γ ∈ P(M) with Γ ≥ ωω then M has a
minimum β-(GB+ ETRΓ)-realization.
The purpose of requiring Γ ≥ ωω is that this ensures ETRΓ is equivalent to the existence of Γ-
iterated truth predicates relative to any class. See corollary 10. The same applies to later theorems,
but I will suppress making this comment every time.
Proof of lemma 34. This is done almost the same as the proof for theorem 32. Namely, set X0 =
Def(M ; Γ) and set Xn+1 to consist of all classes of M definable from TrΓ(A) for A ∈ Xn. Finally,
set X =
⋃
n Xn. These are well-defined because Γ is a well-order. Then, similar to before, (M,X )
is easily seen to be contained in any β-model (M,Y) |= GB + ETRΓ and is itself a β-model of
GB+ ETRΓ. 
Theorem 35. Let Γ be a name for a class well-order ≥ ωω which is absolute to L. That is, Γ is
defined by some first-order formula without parameters so that any model of GB thinks the class
defined by that formula is well-ordered and moreover ΓM = ΓL
M
. (For instance, Γ might be Ord.)
If there is a β-model of GB + ETRΓ then there is a minimum β-model of GB + ETRΓ. And this
minimum β-model moreover satisfies Global Choice.
If there is to be a minimum β-model of GB + ETRΓ it must have a first-order part of the form
Lα. The point of requiring Γ to be absolute to L is to exclude uninteresting counterexamples like
“Γ = Ord if V = L and Γ = ωω otherwise”. And Γ should be definable by a first-order formula so
that different GB-realizations for the same M agree on what Γ is.
Proof. This follows from lemma 34 plus the fact that if M is β-(GB + ETRΓ)-realizable then so is
LM . This fact can be proved similar to the argument for lemma 33.1. The difference is that rather
than needing to consider recursions along any well-founded relation, we only consider recursions
along well-founded relations of rank ≤ Γ. 
We get minimum transitive models for ETROrd and other sufficiently weak fragments of ETR.
Lemma 36. If transitive M |= ZF is (GB + ETROrd)-realizable then M has a minimum (GB +
ETROrd)-realization. If M has a definable global well-order then this minimum (GB + ETROrd)-
realization moreover satisfies Global Choice.
Proof. For the proof of lemma 34 the only place it was used that M is β-(GB + ETRΓ)-realizable
was to get that Γ really is well-founded (i.e. in V ). But the Ord of a transitive model of GB is
well-founded, even if it fails to be a β-model. So the exact same argument goes through. That is,
the minimum (GB + ETROrd)-realization for M is X =
⋃
n Xn where X0 = Def(M) and Xn+1 =⋃
{Def(M ; TrOrd(A)) : A ∈ Xn}. 
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Theorem 37. If there is a transitive model of GB + ETROrd then there is a minimum transitive
model of GB+ ETROrd. And this minimum model satisfies Global Choice.
Proof. Combine lemma 36 plus the fact that M being (GB + ETROrd)-realizable implies L
M is
(GB+ETROrd)-realizable. Again, this is proved much the same as lemma 33.1, except looking only
at recursions along well-founded relations of rank ≤ Ord. 
The attentive reader will notice that the above argument applies to more than just Ord. Specifi-
cally, the only fact about Ord that was used was that if M is transitive then OrdM is well-founded.
The same argument goes through if Ord is replaced by a name for an ordinal or a class well-order
which is well-founded in any transitive model. So the same argument goes through more generally,
for example if Ord is replaced by ω1 or Ord
Ord or OrdOrd
Ord
+OrdOrd +Ord or many other names
for well-orders.
Left open by this analysis is how far we can go. There are names Γ for class well-orders so
that there are transitive (M,X ) with Γ(M,X ) ill-founded (i.e. in V ). In particular, this holds if Γ
is defined as the least class well-order so that LΓ is admissible. But that definition of Γ requires
quantifying over classes. What if we only allow definitions that are first-order?
Question 38. If Γ is a name for a class well-order defined by a first-order formula, must it be the
case that ΓM is well-founded (in the ambient universe) for any transitive M |= ZF?
To finish this section, let us see that ETR is not equivalent to ETRΓ for any Γ. Moreover, we
can separate fragments of ETR. This establishes that theorem 35 is not redundant with theorem
33 and that theorem 37 does not immediately imply that there is a minimum transitive model of
ETR.
First, if Γ is sufficiently smaller than ∆ then a model of ETRΓ need not be a model of ETR∆.
Theorem 39. Let (M,X ) |= GB and let Γ ∈ X be a well-order ≥ ωω. Suppose that (M,X ) |=
ETRΓ·ω. Then, there is Y ⊆ X coded in X so that (M,Y) |= GB+ ETRΓ but (M,Y) 6|= ETRΓ·ω. If
(M,X ) moreover satisfies Global Choice, then Y can be picked so that (M,Y) also satisfies Global
Choice.
Proof. Define
Y = {X ∈ X : X ∈ Def(M ; TrΞ), where Ξ is some initial segment of Γ · ω
M}.
Then, Y is coded in X via the code C = {((g, ϕ, a), x) : (g, ϕ, aax) ∈ TrΓ·ω}. Also, Y is the
increasing union of the Def(M ; TrΞ) for Ξ initial segments of Γ ·ω, each of which is a GB-realization
for M . Thus, (M,Y) |= GB. Next, (M,Y) satisfies Elementary Transfinite Recursion for recursions
of rank ≤ Γ because given X ∈ Y it must be that X ∈ Def(M ; TrΞ) for some Ξ an initial segment
of Γ · ω and thus TrΓ(X) ∈ Def(M ; TrΞ+Γ(X)) ⊆ Y. Finally, (M,Y) 6|= ETRΓ·ω because it does not
contain TrΓ·ω.
To prove the fact about Global Choice, do the same construction but look at iterated truth
predicates relative to a fixed global well-order. 
This result is optimal for transitive models because ETRΓ is equivalent to ETRΓ·n for any standard
n ∈ ω.26
26For ω-nonstandard models ETRΓ is not equivalent to ETR<Γ·ω . Suppose (M,X ) |= ETRΓ·ω and let I ⊆ ω
M be
an initial segment closed under addition. A similar construction can be used to get Y ⊆ X so that (M,Y) satisfies
ETRΓ·n if and only if n ∈ I.
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By near the same argument one can separate ETRΓ from ETR<Γ, for Γ satisfying a basic closure
condition.
Corollary 40. Let (M,X ) |= GB and let Γ ∈ X be a well-order ≥ ωω so that Γ is closed under
addition. That is, if ∆ < Γ is a well-order then ∆ + ∆ < Γ. Then, if (M,X ) |= ETRΓ there is
Y ⊆ X coded in X so that (M,Y) |= GB+ETR<Γ but (M,Y) 6|= ETRΓ. If (M,X ) moreover satisfies
Global Choice then Y may be fixed so that (M,Y) also satisfies global choice. 
As an immediate corollary we get that fragments of ETR can be separated by consistency
strength.
Corollary 41. Let Γ be a name for a well-order ≥ ωω, given by a first-order formula without
parameters. Then GB + ETR proves Con(GB + ETRΓ). Moreover if Γ and ∆ are names for well-
orders given by first-order formulae without parameters, then GB proves Γ · ω ≤ ∆ implies that
GB+ ETR∆ proves Con(GB+ ETRΓ).
Proof. Let (M,X ) |= GB + ETR∆. By the previous theorem there is Y ⊆ X coded in X so that
(M,Y) |= GB + ETRΓ. But (M,X ) has access to the full second-order truth predicate for coded
models, via an elementary recursion of length ω. So (M,X ) |= Con(GB + ETRΓ). 
One can similarly state and prove a separation of ETR<Γ and ETRΓ by consistency strength. I
leave this to the reader.
In theorem 39 we produced a model (M,Y) of GB+ETRΓ which was not a model of GB+ETRΓ·ω.
But this was due to a deficiency the second-order part. We produced Y by taking a restricted
collection of classes from X so as to not have long enough iterated truth predicates to get a model
of ETRΓ·ω. Can we separate fragments of ETR with the first-order part of a model? That is, is
there M |= ZFC so that M is (GB+ ETRΓ)-realizable but not (GB + ETRΓ·ω)-realizable?
Of course, if we put no restriction on M then this follows immediately from the fact that GB+
ETRΓ·ω proves the consistency of GB + ETRΓ. If M is the first-order part of a model of GB +
ETRΓ +¬Con(GB+ ETRΓ) then M will not be (GB+ ETRΓ·ω)-realizable. Such M will necessarily
be ω-nonstandard. Can we make the same separation, but with an M which is ω-standard, or even
transitive?
The answer is yes, looking below ETROrd.
Theorem 42. Suppose γ is a name for an ordinal ≥ ωω given by a first-order formula without
parameters. (In particular, γ is a set, not a proper class.) If there is a transitive model of GB +
ETRγ·ω then there is transitive M which is (GB+ETRγ)-realizable but not (GB+ETRγ·ω)-realizable.
Proof. Take (N,Y) |= GB + ETRγ·ω which has a first-order definable global well-order. Consider
the iterated truth predicates ~T = {Trξ : ξ = γ · n} and let (M ; ~S) = Sk
(N,~T )(γ) be the Skolem hull
of γ in the structure (N ; ~T ). By elementarity, ~S = {(Trξ)M : ξ = γ · n}. Moreover, γ · n ∈ N for all
n because (N ; ~T ) satisfies that the length of each truth predicate in ~T is a set.
Let X = Def(M ; ~S). Then, (M,X ) |= ETRγ ; given A ∈ X there is n so that A is definable from
Trγ·n(G¯). But then Trγ(A) is definable from Trγ·(n+1).
However, M is not (GB + ETRγ·ω)-realizable. This is because the (γ · ω + 1)-iterated truth
predicate for M reveals that M is a Skolem hull and hence countable. But no model of ZFC thinks
that it is countable. So no GB-realization for M can contain TrMγ·ω+1, which GB + ETRγ·ω proves
exists. 
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The proof that there is a minimum β-model of GB+ETR came down to two facts: first, that if a
model of ZFC with a definable global well-order is β-(GB+ETR)-realizable then it has a minimum β-
(GB+ETR)-realization; second, that ifM is β-(GB+ETR)-realizable then so is LM . One strategy to
try to prove the existence of a minimum transitive model of GB+ETR would be to prove analogues
of these two facts. The latter—i.e. that ifM is (GB+ETR)-realizable then so is LM—can be proven
by an argument similar to the proof of lemma 33.1.
I do not see how to settle the analogue of the first fact. Working towards a positive answer, the
proof of theorem 33 does not generalize to show that transitive (GB+ ETR)-realizable models have
minimum (GB + ETR)-realizations. Working towards a negative answer, the argument in the next
section that no countable model of ZFC has a minimum KM-realization does not generalize down
to GB+ETR. The trouble is that GB+ETR is too weak for the same proof to go through. Namely,
GB+ ETR does not prove that Hyp(V ) exists; cf. lemma 50.1.
Question 43. If M is (GB + ETR)-realizable, must M have a minimum (GB + ETR)-realization?
What if we restrict to the case where M is transitive?
A positive answer to this question would imply a positive answer to the following, the main open
question from this article.
Question 44. Is there a minimum transitive model of GB+ ETR?
I have a partial answer.
Theorem ([Wil18, theorem 4.40]). Suppose M |= ZF is (GB + ETR)-realizable. Then M has
minimal (GB + ETR)-realizations. Further, if X is any (GB + ETR)-realization for M then X
contains precisely one of these minimal realizations. Even further, if X and Y are amalgamable
(GB+ETR)-realizations, meaning there is a GB-realization Z ⊇ X ,Y for M , then X and Y contain
the same minimal realization.27
6. KM and other strong theories
Before presenting the results about models of KM, let me review for the benefit of the reader
some facts from the study of admissible sets. Kripke–Platek set theory KP is the (first-order) set
theory consisting of the axioms of Extensionality, Pairing, and Union, along with the Σ0-Separation,
Σ0-Collection, and Π1-Foundation
28 schemata. It will be convenient in this context to go beyond
pure sets and consider urelements, objects which are not sets but can be members of sets. KPU
is the variation of KP formulated in a context allowing urelements; see [Bar75, Chapter I.2] for
a precise axiomatization. Transitive models of KPU are known as admissible sets. I will write
A = (A,U ;R0, . . .) for the admissible set A with U as its set of urelements, ∈ for its membership
relation, and additional relations, constants, or functions R0, . . . Given a structure (U ;R0, . . .),
where we may assume U consists of urelements, there is a smallest admissible set A = (A,U ;R0, . . .)
with U ∈ A. This smallest admissible set containing U is denoted Hyp(U). If U is a well-founded
model of set theory without urelements then U will be isomorphic to a pure transitive set in Hyp(U),
where a set is pure if it has no urelements in its transitive closure. If we call this transitive set U¯ ,
then the pure sets of Hyp(U) are precisely Lα(U¯), where α is the least ordinal so that Lα(U¯) |= KP.
And from Lα(U¯) we can recover U thought of as a set of urelements and all of Hyp(U). When
27The version of this theorem in my dissertation is stated for M satisfying AC, but it is straightforward to see
that this extra assumption is not used.
28Recall that Γ-Foundation asserts that every nonempty class definable from a formula in Γ has an ∈-minimal
element.
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working with U a transitive model of set theory I will tacitly identify Hyp(U), the model with
urelements, with Lα(U¯), the model with only pure sets.
There is a tight connection between admissible sets and infinitary logics. Countable admissible
sets capture fragments of Lω1,ω which admit a form of compactness. Let A be a countable admissible
set. Then LA is the infinitary fragment of L∞,ω associated with A. Namely, formulae in LA may
only have finite quantifier blocks but allow disjunctions and conjunctions over Φ a set of formulae so
that Φ ∈ A. Barwise proved that these admissible fragments of Lω1,ω satisfy a form of compactness:
if an LA theory T ⊆ A is Σ1 definable over A then T has a model if and only if every T0 ⊆ T in A
has a model.
I will make use of the following result about admissible sets, due also to Barwise. First, let me
fix some notation. Consider the structure A = (A,U ;E, . . .) where U consists of urelements, A
consists of sets, and E is a binary relation. For a ∈ A set aE = {x ∈ A : x E a}. Say that S ⊆ U is
internal for A if there is a ∈ A so that S = aE .
Theorem 45 (Barwise [Bar75, Theorem IV.1.1]). Let (U ;R0, . . .) be a countable structure and let
A = Hyp(U). Suppose T is an LA theory which is Σ1-definable over A and has a model of the form
B = (B,U ;E,R0, . . .). Suppose S ⊆ U is internal for every such B. Then S ∈ Hyp(U).
This result is an infinitary version of a well-known theorem due to Gandy, Kreisel, and Tait,
with Hyp(U) being the higher-order analogue to the collection of hyperarithmetic sets.
Theorem (Gandy–Kreisel–Tait [GKT60]). Let T be a Π11-definable set of axioms for second-order
arithmetic, where T extends Σ11-AC0. If S ⊆ ω is internal to every model of T , then S is hyper-
arithmetic.
The admissible preliminaries out of the way, let us begin with Marek and Mostowski’s theorem
that there is a smallest β-model of KM. I include a proof for the sake of completeness of presentation.
Theorem 46 (Marek–Mostowski [MM75]). There is a minimum β-model of KM, if there is any
β-model of KM. Moreover, this minimum model also satisfies Global Choice and Class Choice.
Proof. Suppose there is a β-model of KM. By theorem 18 there is a β-model of KMC + Class
Collection. Its unrolling is a well-founded model of ZFC−I .
29 So there is a transitive model of ZFC−I .
Let Lα be the minimum transitive model of ZFC
−
I .
30 Let κ < α be the largest cardinal in Lα. Set
(M,X ) = (Lκ,P(Lκ) ∩ Lα). I claim that (M,X ) is the minimum β-model of KM. First, observe
that it is itself a β-model since Lα is correct about well-foundedness.
Take (N, Y¯) a β-model of KM. By theorem 18 there is Y ⊆ Y so that (LN ,Y) |= KMC + Class
Collection. Now letW |= ZFC−I be the unrolling of (N,Y). Because (N,Y) is a β-model,W must be
well-founded. Identify W with its transitive collapse. Then, Lα ⊆W , because Lα is the minimum
transitive model of ZFC−I .
Let λ be the largest cardinal in W . There are two cases. The first is if λ > κ. Then, because
W thinks λ is inaccessible, W thinks P(Lκ) exists. Therefore, X = P(Lκ) ∩ Lα ∈ Vλ
W = N . The
second case is if λ = κ. Then, OrdW ≥ α by the minimality of Lα. Thus, X = P(Lκ) ∩ Lα ⊆
P(Lκ) ∩W so X ⊆ Y. In either case, we then conclude that M ⊆ N and X ⊆ Y¯. 
Essentially the same argument gives the existence of minimum β-KM-realizations.
29Recall definition 17.
30To see such exists: Take M |= ZFC−I transitive with κ ∈ M the largest cardinal. Then κ is inaccessible in L
M
so L
(κ+)L
M |= ZFC
−
I . So the minimum transitive model of ZFC
−
I is Lα for α least such that there is a transitive
model of ZFC−I of height α.
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Theorem 47 (Marek and Mostowski [MM75]). Suppose M |= ZF is β-KM-realizable. Then M has
a minimum β-KM-realization. In particular, in this case (M,Xβ,KM) |= KM.
31 
Ratajczyk improved their methods to apply to weaker theories.
Theorem 48 (Ratajczyk [Rat79]). Let k ≥ 1. There is a minimum β-model of GB + Π1k-CA, if
there is any β-model of GB + Π1k-CA. Moreover, this minimum model also satisfies Global Choice
and Class Choice. And if M |= ZF is β-(GB + Π1k-CA)-realizable then M has a minimum β-
(GB+Π1k-CA)-realization.
The analogous result fails if we look at transitive models, rather than confining ourselves to
β-models.
Theorem 49 (Main Theorem 3). There is not a minimum transitive model of KM. Moreover,
for any real r there is not a minimum transitive model of KM which contains r. Indeed, the same
holds if KM is replaced by any T extending GB + Π11-CA with the property that T is an element of
any transitive model of T . In particular, this holds for any computably axiomatizable extension of
GB+Π11-CA.
The original proof I found for this went through Barwise’s notion of the admissible cover. Ali
Enayat privately communicated to me an alternative argument which goes through the above
theorem of Barwise. With his kind permission it is his proof I present here.32
The key fact to establish this theorem is encapsulated by the following lemma.
Lemma 50 (Key Lemma; Ali Enayat). SupposeM |= ZF is countable. Let T ⊆ ω be a second-order
set theory extending GB+∆11-CA with one of the following properties, depending on whether M is
ω-standard. If M is ω-standard, then T ∈ M ; or if M is ω-nonstandard, then there is t ∈ P(ω)M
so that T is the standard part of t. Suppose M is T -realizable. Then
XT (M) =
⋂
{X ⊆ P(M) : (M,X ) |= T } = Hyp(M) ∩ P(M).
Proof. (⊆) We want to consider two-sorted models of the form B = (B,M ;E). This argument now
breaks into cases depending upon whether M is ω-standard. First work in the case where M is
ω-standard. Consider the following LHyp(M)-theory T¯ which can hold of such a two-sorted model.
Namely, T¯ asserts that M and C make up, respectively, the sets and classes of a model of T , using
the membership relation E so that E ↾M is ∈M . It is immediate that (B,M ;E) |= T¯ . Note M is
definable by a single LHyp(M) sentence, and so we get that T¯ really can express that the first-order
part of the model is M . Similarly, we can express as a single LHyp(M) assertion that E ↾ M is
∈M . Combined with the assumption that T ∈ M we get that T¯ ∈ Hyp(M), and in particular
is Σ1-definable over Hyp(M). Observe that any (M,X ) |= T gives rise to B |= T¯ in the obvious
manner. So if S ⊆M is an element of every T -realization forM then S is internal for every B |= T¯ .
So by Barwise’s theorem 45 we get that S ∈ Hyp(M).
Now let us consider the case when M is ω-nonstandard. In this case, we want T¯ to be the
LHyp(M)-theory asserting that M and C make up, respectively, the sets and classes of a model of
the standard part of t, using the membership relation E so that E ↾ M is ∈M . Again, as a single
LHyp(M)-sentence we can express that the first-order part really is M and that E ↾ M is ∈
M . So
to see that T¯ ∈ Hyp(M), and thus that T¯ really is a LHyp(M)-theory, we only have to see that
31Recall definition 6.
32The reader who wishes to see the admissible cover argument can find it in my dissertation [Wil18], written while
the current article was under review.
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the standard part of t is in Hyp(M). First, observe that since Hyp(M) has an infinite set as an
element, namely M itself, Hyp(M) must contain ω as an element. Therefore, Hyp(M) can see the
unique embedding of ω onto an initial segment of ωM . From this embedding Hyp(M) can extract
the standard part of any x ∈M so that M |= x ⊆ ωM . The rest of the argument is now the same:
If S ⊆M is an element of every T -realization for M then S is internal for every B |= T¯ and so by
Barwise’s theorem 45 we get that S ∈ Hyp(M).
(⊇) This argument is the same whether or not M is ω-standard. Take S ∈ Hyp(M) ∩ P(M).
Then S is ∆11 over M without class parameters, but possibly allowing parameters from M ; see
[Bar75, corollary IV.3.4]. Observe that Σ11 definitions (without class parameters) over M are up-
ward absolute. That is, for a ∈ M and X ⊆ P(M), if ϕ(x) is Σ11 then (M,X ) |= ϕ(a) implies
(M,P(M)) |= ϕ(a). This is because any witness in X to ϕ(a) must also be in P(M). And du-
ally, Π11 definitions (without class parameters) over M are downward absolute; if ϕ(x) is Π
1
1 then
(M,P(M)) |= ϕ(a) implies (M,X ) |= ϕ(a). Let X be any T -realization forM . Then, combining the
absoluteness facts with the fact that T includes ∆11-Comprehension we get that S ∈ X , completing
the argument. 
Proof of theorem 49 (Ali Enayat). Fix a real r. If T has no transitive model containing r, then the
conclusion is trivially satisfied. So assume we are in the case where there is a transitive model of
T containing r. Suppose toward a contradiction that (M,X ) is the minimum transitive model of T
which contains r. By a Lo¨wenheim–Skolem argument it must be that M is countable. So by the
key lemma we get that X = Hyp(M) ∩ P(M). Let us see that this is in fact impossible, giving the
desired contradiction.
Recall from the discussion at the end of section 2 that T is strong enough to carry out the
unrolling construction, working with membership codes for ‘sets’ of rank > Ord. As I remarked,
the unrolling and cutting off constructions are inverses. Applied to this case, we get that cutting off
Hyp(M) to get (M,X ) and then unrolling produces an isomorphic copy of Hyp(M). In particular,
we get that (M,X ) unrolls to Hyp(M).
In that earlier discussion we were interested in the structure obtained by looking at all of these
membership codes, but here we are also interested in properties of individual membership codes.
Specifically, given a membership code which represents a transitive set33 we can ask which set
theoretic axioms it satisfies. We can sensibly formulate this, since given the truth predicate Tr(E)
we can extract a truth predicate for the transitive set coded by E. More specifically, we can
ask whether E represents a transitive model of KP. And we can also ask whether the canonical
membership code representingM is a member of E. That is, we can query whether there is aEmE
so that E restricted to below a is isomorphic to ∈M . In summary, we can ask whether there is
coded in X an admissible set which contains M as an element.
Let “Hyp(V ) exists” be the statement in second-order set theory asserting that there is a mem-
bership code for a transitive model of KP which contains the class of all sets as an element. If there
is any such membership code, there there is a minimum up to isomorphism such membership code.
This is then the membership code for Hyp(V ).
Lemma 50.1. GB+Π11-CA proves that Hyp(V ) exists.
This lemma can also be found as [ABF, theorem 64]. Antos, Barton, and Friedman also show
that the classes coded as elements of Hyp(V ) form a model of GB+∆11-CA, whence they conclude
33To be clear, E is a membership code for a transitive set if a E b E mE , where mE is the maximum element of
E, implies a E mE .
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that GB+∆11-CA does not prove that Hyp(V ) exists. One can check that this model also satisfies
ETR, and so GB+∆11-CA+ ETR does not prove that Hyp(V ) exists. For the benefit of the reader,
I provide a proof of this result here from the assumption of KM. The reader who wants a proof
from the weaker theory should consult Antos, Barton, and Friedman, or see my dissertation [Wil18,
lemma 4.24].
Proof from KM. By theorem 18 we may assume Class Collection without loss. Now work in the
unrolling, which satisfies ZF−I . Let κ denote the largest cardinal in the unrolled structure, so that
Vκ in the unrolling is the V of the ground model. Note that ZF
− proves the reflection schema
relative to the L(A) hierarchy for any A. That is, for each formula ϕ(x, a) with a parameter a, ZF−
proves that there are cofinally many ordinals α so that for all x ∈ Lα(A) we have Lα(A) |= ϕ(x, a)
if and only if ϕ(x, a)L(A). This is proved via the usual argument, but using the L(A) hierarchy
instead of the V hierarchy. Since ZF− includes KP and “N |= KP” can be expressed as a single
formula in the language of set theory, we get that in the unrolling there is an ordinal α > OrdM
so that Lα(Vκ) |= KP. Thus, in the ground model satisfying KM + Class Collection we get that
there is a membership code for a transitive model of KP which contains the class of all sets as an
element. 
By this lemma, there is a membership code which (M,X ) thinks represents Hyp(M) inside
X = Hyp(M)∩P(M). Thus, if we unroll X to get Hyp(M) then we find that there is A ∈ Hyp(M)
which is a transitive model of KP withM ∈ A. This contradicts that Hyp(M) is the minimum such
transitive model of KP. Therefore, our original assumption that (M,X ) is the minimum transitive
model of T must be wrong. So T does not have a minimum transitive model. 
Note that we actually proved the following stronger result.
Corollary 51. Let M |= ZF be countable and transitive and suppose T ∈ M is an extension of
GB+Π11-CA. Then M does not have a minimum T -realization.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that X is the minimum T -realization forM . By lemma 50,
it must be that X = Hyp(M) ∩ P(M). But because T proves Hyp(V ) exists we get A ∈ Hyp(M)
which is an admissible set containing M as an element, a contradiction. 
This result also holds in case M is not transitive. (But note that if M is ω-nonstandard then
instead of asking that T ∈M we have to ask that T is the standard part of an M -real t ∈ P(ω)M .)
See [Wil18, corollary 4.26].
A natural next question is to weaken minimum to minimal, and ask whether there are minimal
transitive models of KM. This is answered by the following theorem.34
Theorem 52. Let M |= ZF be countable. Then M has a minimal KM-realization if and only if M
has a β-KM-realization.
Proof. (⇐) By theorem 47 if M has a β-KM-realization it must have a minimum β-KM-realization.
Then by observation 21 this minimum β-KM-realization must be a minimal KM-realization for M .
(⇒) This direction goes through a theorem due to Quinsey.
Theorem (Quinsey [Qui80, corollary 6.7]). Fix n ∈ ω and let W |= ZF− be countable and non-
standard. Then there is U |= ZF− so that U ≺Σn W is strictly end-extended by W .
34I thank the referee for pointing out to me the forward direction of the argument for this theorem.
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The argument goes by the contrapositive. Suppose that M has no β-KM-realization. If M is not
KM-realizable at all, then the conclusion is trivial. For the substantive case, suppose (M,X ) |= KM.
If X were uncountable, then by the downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem it could not be a minimal
KM-realization for M . In the case where X is countable, let W |= ZF−I be the unrolling of (M,X ).
Then W is nonstandard, as (M,X ) is wrong about well-foundedness. Because being the largest
cardinal of a model of ZF− is a definable property, Quinsey’s theorem gives us U |= ZF−I which is
strictly end-extended by W so that U and W agree on Vκ, with κ the largest cardinal of the model.
Thus, (M,Y) = (Vκ
U , Vκ+1
U ) |= KM is a strict submodel of (M,X ). Therefore, X is not a minimal
KM-realization for M , as desired. 
Corollary 53. There is no minimal transitive model of KM. That is, if (M,X ) |= KM then there
is (N,Y) |= KM a strict submodel of (M,X ).
Proof. If (M,X ) were to be a minimal transitive model of KM, then X would have to be a minimal
KM-realization forM . In such a case, by the previous theorem it must be that (M,X ) is a β-model.
Now apply Marek and Mostowski’s result [MM75, theorem 3.2] that every β-model of KM contains
a transitive model of KM as a set. This then gives that there is (N,Y) ∈ M a transitive model of
KM, witnessing that (M,X ) cannot be a minimal transitive model of KM. 
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